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The Establishment of the State-Owned Yawata Steel Works (2)
　　 The Integrated Steel Works That Promoted Japan’s Industrialisation 
When the Country Entered the Modern Industrial World as a Latecomer
Norikazu  Shimizu
With regard to steel materials for military weapons, substantial 
progress was made during and after the Russo-Japanese War. Facilities 
improved considerably in the thick steel plate mill, crucible steel mill 
(for the manufacture of gun barrels), bullet swaging mill and steel forg-
ing mill (for railway axles, tool steel, high speed steel and gun barrel 
steel forging).  While, as of the end of Meiji era, 78,000 tons of iron and 
steel materials were demanded to the military, 35,000 tons were steel 
materials’ demand, and the Yawata  Works supplied 20,000 tons.  It 
would be fair to say that, “around that time, this enterprise, at long 
last, grew to establish its status as a major production site of steel ma-
terials of military grade.  It virtually accomplished the original goal to 
contribute to the Japanese military”  “As for the warship building, this 
plant, at long last, grew to be capable of manufacturing most parts and 
components.  They included armour plates of ironclad battleships and 
materials for cruisers.”  “As to the service for the army, the Yawata 
Works was able to supply high quality materials for the manufacture of 
rifles and artillery shells.”
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Around the end of Meiji era, 98 % of steel products of the Yawata Works 
were sold to its customers.  One third of that sale was accounted for by 
rail products.  40 % of the rails were sold to railway undertakings.  In 
those days, the National Railway Bureau was the largest customer for 
this business.  On the other hand, the supply to the private sector was 
limited.  Private sector companies were doing business in shipbuilding, 
machine manufacturing, civil engineering and construction.  Among 
them, the civil engineering and construction companies were the larg-
est customers.  “Regarding construction materials, a large portion was 
represented by steel structural members, bridge materials and gas tank 
materials.   Major customers were Ishikawajima Shipbuilding Yard, 
Nippon Railway Vehicle Manufacturing Company , Kawasaki Ship-
building Yard and manufacturing plants adjunct to the National  Rail-
way Bureau.  The annual production amounted to about 20 plus several 
thousand tons, the value of which was approximately 2 million plus 
several hundred thousand yen.  Materials for this production were par-
tially supplied by the Yawata Works itself.  These internal supplies in-
cluded steel plates, angle steel and others.  Despite this effort, however, 
the supplies were never sufficient.   As far as those materials were con-
cerned, the demands of steel materials had to depend heavily on the 
import from abroad.”  While there was an increasing domestic demand 
for steel materials, the domestic company could not satisfy all of it.  The 
self-sufficiency rate of steel materials was accordingly limited to the 
level slightly over 30 % in those days.
It should be noted that, because the site of The Yawata Works was cho-
sen in a remote underdeveloped as well as impoverished area of Ky-
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ushu, this project provided the villagers in the hinterland with tremen-
dous economic benefits.   When a large state-owned plant was 
constructed and operated with leading edge technology, huge influence 
and character were brought to this area and residents.
When construction works began, “construction workmen, steeplejacks, 
boilermaking, carpenters, blacksmiths and others came over to the site 
from various parts of Japan, seeking job opportunities.”  By 1899, in 
terms of headcounts, 600,000 people had worked at the site.  Once the 
operation started, because it was a state-run enterprise, the project was 
managed in a bureaucratic way, giving a high priority to the institu-
tional organisation.  Everything was controlled by the regulations. 
Three strictly defined ranks existed among the bureaucrats working in 
there.  Those of the highest rank were senior officials, who were classi-
fied into two groups.  Those in the first group were high ranking gov-
ernment officials and “imperial appointees”.  They were directly ap-
pointed by the Emperor.  Those in the second group were also high 
ranking government officials, who were approved by the Emperor.  Em-
ployees in the second rank were junior officials.  People in the third 
rank were engineers supervising the daily plant operation.  Since plant
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49,042
444,726
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0.590
0.568
0.623
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407,560
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Total 2,496,758 1,468,818 2,786,529 1,768,953 0.635 2,375,097 1,668,505 0.702 2,354,584 1,690,223 0.718 2,456,558 1,903,144
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504
438
629
704
712
829
844
879
882
810
892
914
2,283
1,763
1,729
3,610
6,155
7,263
7,876
7,602
6,457
6,380
6,483
6,949
1,697
1,440
1,751
1,973
2,250
2,725
2,692
3,323
3,606
3,390
4,115
3,854
workers were not government employees, they had no formally guaran-
teed posts.  They were hired on a tentative basis according to the needs 
in operation.  In 1904, about 6,000 plant workers were working.  The 
number increased to approximately 10,000 in 1914.  Plant workers’ liv-
ing and working conditions were pretty awful.  Their working environ-
ment was often dangerous.  Wages were low in both relative and abso-
lute terms.  They worked in a two shift system.  One shift lasted for 12 
hours.  This shift system continued until a major labour dispute oc-
curred in 1920.  Because of high consumer prices and living costs, many 
plant workers lived in poverty.  “Many of them were those who roam 
about from one job to another without settling in the same place.”  The 
retention rate of workmen was pretty low.  Because of the geographical 
conditions of the site, it was inevitable that many workers came from 
agricultural communities.  They had no knowledge or experience of iron 
making.  In the initial phase, workers were still observing the conven-
tional life style and custom of rural villages, without adapting them-
selves to the practice of modern industry.  A daily log states, “There 
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were quite a few absentees today. . . due to rainy weather and because 
it was the beginning of the month.  The daily works as planned were 
barely finished.”   Absenteeism was very common, which was a head-
ache to foremen and the management.  In order to elevate the workers’ 
retention rate, the management made effort to enhance the welfare for 
the employees.  Specifically speaking, company accommodation, compa-
ny-owned shop service and mutual aid association were offered for the 
furtherance of employees’ well-being.  On the other hand, the manage-
ment embarked upon a scheme to nurture core skilled workers.  In the 
post-Russo-Japanese-War period, it was understood that “there would 
be a severe shortage of skilled workers rather than of engineers in the 
forthcoming years.”  In order to cope with the anticipated labour short-
age, the management decided to “provide workers with proper educa-
tion to develop them as skilled workers.”  For this purpose, a training 
centre was established to educate the youth.
As the scale of plant operation expanded, the population increased in 
the surrounding area.  Yahata Village became Yahata Town in 1901 
with the population of 6,652.  In 1917, it turned to Yahata City, the pop-
ulation of which was 84,682.  Actually the City’s population growth rate 
was the highest in Japan.  According to Japan’s first census data of 
1920, the population of Yahata City was 100,235, the largest in Fuku-
oka Prefecture (Fukuoka City: 85,331, Moji City: 72,111, Wakamatsu 
City: 49,336, Kokura City: 33,954).  While 18 % of Yahata citizens were 
born in the city, 53 % came from outside Fukuoka Prefecture.  As for 
the age distribution of citizens, the youth accounted for a large portion. 
The age bracket between 20 and 24 represented 13 % of the total, the 
largest of all.  Infants and toddlers accounted for 10 % of the total. 
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“Many workers were unmarried when they first came to Yahata.  Only 
after they got employed, feeling fairly comfortable about their financial 
situation, they thought of marrying and getting children.  After secur-
ing their income, many workers invited their parents and siblings to 
Yahata to live with them.”  Until they became financially stable, many 
were “staying at temporary accommodation here and there with their 
colleagues or friends”.  In those days, a large part of the city was occu-
pied by the plant and government-owned residential accommodation for 
the senior/junior officials, engineers, those in clerical jobs and low rank-
ing employees.  In addition, “an increasing number of makeshift houses 
were being built here and there all over the city every day.  The number 
increased at a rapid speed, continuing almost infinitely.”  “There was no 
city park, hospital, or citizens’ hall.  There was no sign of social welfare 
in here”.  “It was as if 110,000 people had simply gathered at this place 
purposelessly and merely for expedience.”   It was a “huge labour pool-
ing city generated too abruptly with no specific plan”.  By 1910 or so, 
136 chimneys had been erected at the central boiler zone in the premis-
es of the Yawata  Works, looking like a forest.  Soot and dust released 
The central boiler zone
from the chimneys overcast 
the city.  People were talking 
that “sparrows in Yahata 
were black, being covered 
with soot and dust”.
The following summarises 
what was brought about by 
the launching of The Yawata 
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Works by the end of Meiji era to the beginning of Taisho era:
1. The original budget for this state undertaking worth 4.09 million 
yen swelled ten folds, eventually exceeding 40 million yen.  It took 
the project 15 years to be fully grown, accomplishing the annual 
steel products of 180,000 tons, which was comparable with that of 
industrialised nations in the world.  In addition to the capital ex-
penditure, the total employment capital injected in this initiative 
amounted to 10 million yen.  In those days, it was generally said 
that the global average of investment cost necessary for the 
launching of an integrated mill for both pig iron and steel produc-
tion, which produced 150,000 to 200,000 tons of steel products a 
year, would be 12 to 15 million yen.  Judging by that standard, Ja-
pan’s government-led initiative was a quite inefficient investment. 
This programme had unique nature in that a certain mission was 
imposed on it.  It was a state-owned undertaking.  Because of this, 
the Yawata Works was obliged to accommodate a diverse domestic 
demand for steel materials.  It had to put up with “inevitable dis-
advantages deriving from producing small volumes of many differ-
ent products.”  It had to cope with the “financial burden and pres-
sure when trying to respond to product orders given by the 
military”.  The enterprise was expected to keep a delicate balance 
between the two tasks, that is, “accommodating the military de-
mand on the one hand, and surviving as an economically viable 
business on the other”.  After going through many ups and downs, 
the Yawata Works managed to depart from financial deficits, re-
cording  a surplus in the fiscal year 1910.
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Total investments for The Yawata Works in the founding period (1896~1910)
founding
Budget
expenditure
settlement
supplement
settlement
temporary
settlement
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
579,762
1,741,621
1,189,415
2,845,168
7,311,573
5,335,155
100,000
1,056,463
6,838
1,599,840
4,399,200
5,936,180
2,980,323
243,278
248,500
157,529
709,223
1,747,572
3,011,008
7,126,198
5,853,334
490,117
820,011
24,570
1,181,054
3,498,885
4,729,547
4,407,073
1,470,113
255,427
322,762
495,428
20,453 98,000
3,566,143
2,590,640
111,443
Total 35,573,316 35,481,661 838,643 6,366,226
Investment, Expenditure and Balance
founding
investment
operation
cost
employ-
ment
capital
Total
loan at the
end of the
fiscal year
revenue operationcost surplus deficit
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
157,529
709,223
1,747,572
2,911,008
5,226,198
3,692,971
992,438
884,729
1,866,468
3,488,326
4,223,263
4,729,547
4,407,073
1,470,113
255,427
46,297
1,054,064
3,410,871
2,740,294
5,263,668
5,070,551
7,774,277
10,124,745
10,108,588
8,405,222
8,026,335
9,487,029
100,000
2,000,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
4,500,000
157,529
709,223
1,747,572
3,057,305
8,280,262
11,603,842
8,232,732
10,648,397
11,437,019
15,762,603
18,848,008
19,338,135
17,312,295
13,996,448
14,242,456
2,000,000
4,000,000
8,500,000
10,700,000
9,000,000
7,300,000
4,000,000
8,322
201,686
238,574
3,282,252
2,096,772
4,132,585
3,176,871
4,974,398
5,597,145
9,034,444
8,640,921
12,768,133
46,297
1,054,064
3,410,871
2,740,295
5,263,669
5,070,551
7,774,277
10,124,745
10,108,588
8,405,223
8,026,335
9,487,029 52,003
23,678
1,267,252
1,349,778
981,185
990,175
963,194
1,697,247
1,694,247
1,280,683
880,963
2. It was indeed true that the production facilities of this plant, which 
comprised the blast furnaces with a daily production capacity of 
160 tons, coke ovens with bi-product recovery mechanisms, basic 
open hearth furnaces with a daily production capacity of 25 tons, 
could well rival those in advanced nations in the world.  While the 
technological infrastructure was quickly developed to a full degree 
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in the early phase, the company accomplished “technological adap-
tation”, thus integrating itself in the modern industrial world.  It 
achieved technological transfer successfully.
Profit and Loss at The Han-Yey-P’ing kung-ssu
　　　　　　(yuan)
Inner volume per pigiron 1 ton (m3/t)
3. The Yawata Works achieved and maintained autonomy through 
the process of technological transfer.  Although, in the very begin-
ning, Japanese engineers needed to depend on technical supervi-
sion by foreign engineers, they quickly grew to be skilled experts 
capable enough to operate the equipment themselves.  They no 
longer needed to depend on foreign consultants.  They obtained au-
tonomy, continuing the expansion of enterprise.  There were some 
reasons for that accomplishment.  In the plant, intensive effort was 
being made every day for collecting and analysing the operational 
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data and information, so that the actual operational conditions 
were captured on a real time basis.  Information and data were 
managed by a centralised command system, from which correct in-
structions were communicated with mill operators.  The hierarchi-
cal management organisation as well as the strict rank differences 
among the employees contributed significantly to the orderly con-
trol of the enterprise.  An underlying element was the availability 
of a large stable pool of human resources.  The pool comprised effi-
cient senior/junior government officials, competent scientists, engi-
neers, civil servants and others.  It is worth noting their contribu-
tion to the progress in Japan’s industrialisation.
Senior engineering officials were all graduates from Imperial Universi-
ties or Imperial Institutes of Technology.  Junior engineering officials in 
the second rank were apprentices for the senior engineering officials. 
Some of them were graduates from the Imperial University, Imperial 
Institutes of Technology or College of Engineering.
Note:  The Imperial University of Tokyo College of Engineering, 
which was eventually transformed to the Faculty of Engi-
neering, the Imperial University of Tokyo.  Originally this in-
stitute was started as a College of Engineering under the 
Ministry of Public Works, Engineering Bureau, in 1871, be-
ing upgraded to the Imperial College of Engineering in 1877 
before reorganised to become the Imperial University of To-
kyo College of Engineering under the Ministry of Education 
in 1886. 
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Other junior officials were graduates from Imperial Institutes of Technology.
Note:  One of them was established in Tokyo in 1881 as the Tokyo 
Shokko Gakko dedicated to practical engineering education, 
which became the Imperial Tokyo Institute of Technology lat-
er.  In fact, it was the precursor to the current Tokyo Insti-
tute of Technology.  
Furthermore, some junior officials were graduates from Japan’s oldest 
private sector College of Engineering , which was established in 1887 in 
Tokyo.    The graduates from that institute had received more practical 
engineering training before joining the civil service.  The 3rd rank of 
engineers were primarily graduates from the abovementioned private 
sector College of Engineering, who had had experience of working at 
modern private sector companies in the railway, mining and spinning 
industries.  Some had worked at the Kamaishi Mines Tanaka Iron 
Works (Kamaishi Tanaka Works) previously, cumulating hands on 
knowledge and skill related to the modern iron making methods.  Many 
of them were employed by the Yawata Works as medium to lower 
skilled engineers. Actually, the fact that the enterprise of Yawata could 
capitalise on such a large pool of competent engineers available in Ja-
pan was a very important element of success.  Thanks to those people, 
the technological transfer from the west succeeded within a fairly short 
period of time.  The Yawata Works assimilated modern technology from 
the west quickly, leading to the autonomy of operation and succeeding 
in the transplantation of the modern industry from abroad. Through 
the progress of industrialisation, an intensive commitment was made 
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by the Japanese government to the furtherance of engineering educa-
tion and industry technology.  The Yawata  Works could capitalise on 
those resources effectively, thus enhancing their management and tech-
nological approach.  It is also worth noting that underlying all these 
achievements was the strict hierarchical class structure, which was en-
dorsed in the Japan’s modernisation history.
Another important feature of the Yawata  Works was that most high 
ranking senior engineering officials who exercised leadership in project 
management had studied aboard and experienced iron and steel mill 
operations in Germany.   In the area of advanced technological educa-
tion especially, Bergakademie Freiberg played a valuable role for Japa-
nese academics and engineers.  Between 1873 and immediately before 
the outbreak of World War I, 44 Japanese engineers studied at that in-
stitute.  After returning home, some of them were involved with the na-
tional project “Yawata Works”.  Included in this group were Michitaro 
Oshima, Fuyukichi Obana, Kageyoshi Noro, Tetsukichi Mukai and Kai-
chiro Imaizumi.  Furthermore, others educated at Bergakademie Freib-
erg were indirectly involved with the Yawata  Works as well.  For exam-
ple, some became committee members in preparation for the launching. 
Included in this group were Yoshinosuke Hasegawa, Wataru Watanabe, 
Ataru Matoba  and Yoshitaro Watanabe. In Germany, these Japanese 
students engaged in research under the guidance of Prof. Adolf Lede-
bur.  When Michitaro Oshima became a main technical officials  of  the 
Yawata Works, he chose to introduce the iron and steel making technol-
ogy of GHH.  The decision was made in accordance with a suggestion 
from Prof. Ledebur, Oshima’s mentor.  After returning to Japan, many 
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of those Japanese academics /engineers became professors at Imperial 
Universities, where they taught metallurgy, taking the lead in Japan’s 
scientific advancement.  Kaichiro Imaizumi was one of Noro’s students. 
He remembered that the contents of Prof. Ledebur’s lectures were quite 
similar to what he had learned from Noro in Japan. 
Before the finalisation of the “Launch Plan”, three committees were in-
volved in the preparatory stage.  One of their tasks was to carry out 
surveys, experiments and pilot production under the leadership of 
Noro.  Noro and Zouyou Kaneko conducted an experiment in a small 
rented open hearth furnace, owned by an arsenal adjunct to the Tokyo 
Regiment of the Army.  They tested steel making methods using Ka-
maishi pig iron and iron sand.  They also conducted a systematic exper-
iment to produce wrought iron using a puddling furnace.  That particu-
lar furnace had been operated by an iron works run by the Ministry of 
Industry previously.  Because Japan did not have a large stock of scrap 
iron or steel, they conducted a trial production of crude wrought iron 
based on iron sand, trying to discover an alternative raw material of 
steelmaking.  Sand iron was abundant in Japan.  At Furukawa coking 
coal plant, they did an experiment to produce coke of commercial grade. 
Separately from Noro and Kaneko, Jintaro Takayama and Koroku 
Komura, also Noro’s students, were involved in a series of systematic 
tests, in which they tested all refractory bricks available in Japan to 
identify those suitable for the iron and steel industry.  Kaichiro Imaizu-
mi tested steel making methods based on residual compounds collected 
after the copper extraction processes.  He was interested in copper ex-
traction, for which copper sulphide rich iron sulphide was used.  Noro 
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also started research to produce sponge iron from iron sand.  All these 
efforts show that those Japanese scientists aspired to systematically 
discover the most suitable pig iron and steel making methods for the 
Japanese environment.  Their experiments were ambitious in that they 
were keen on using natural resources readily available in Japan.  They 
tried to establish innovative methods and apply them to the modern 
iron and steel industry.  These systematic experiments and research 
were conducted at Army arsenals, the Kamaishi  Tanaka  Works and 
other places.  The experience helped them enhance their knowledge 
and skills, helping them to be better prepared for future technology 
transfer.  They could fulfil their task properly when working with for-
eign engineers invited to the Yawata Works.  Through those experienc-
es, Noro’s academic talent and knowledge increased.  Pragmatic skill 
was accumulated through his involvement with mill operations in Ger-
many and Japan.  Utilising that experience, he became the major driv-
ing force behind the project, ensuring that this state enterprise could 
move forward to its goal.  In addition, that “group of young technocrats 
of high calibre”, comprising academics and engineers, played an essen-
tial role in the early part of Japan’s industrialisation as well. Most of 
them were educated at the Imperial College of Engineering founded by 
the Ministry of Industry or at the Imperial University of Tokyo.  Many 
of them were sent abroad to further their expertise after graduation.
4. The first “Launch Plan” was revised to expand the scale of the 
State-owned Steel Works.  The revision was made based on the 
awareness that demand for iron and steel was rapidly increasing 
and that international competition was intensifying at a great rate. 
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At the Yawata Works, once pig iron production started, the high 
productivity, low labour costs and low intermediate material prices 
favoured the business.  Yawata’s pig iron prices were much lower 
than the international standard.  Utmost efforts were made to re-
duce steel production costs as quickly as possible.  As a result, Jap-
anese pig iron and steel became highly competitive in the interna-
tional market.  The economic viability of the Yawata Works as a 
commercial entity advanced dramatically.
1. The primary mission given to the Yawata  Works was to respond to 
the increasing iron and steel demand in the public and private sec-
tors in Japan.  The problem, however, was that the speed of Japan’
s industrialisation and the increase in demand was much higher 
than the pace of increase in production capacity of the Yawata 
Works.  The outcome was that the self-sufficiency rate was as low 
as 30%, which was far from satisfactory.  As for quality, there were 
critical problems to overcome, symbolised by the occurrence of per-
sistent defects in rail products.  It was urgently needed to develop 
technology to produce low silicate pig iron, so that the basic open 
hearth furnaces would not be damaged.  Improvement of the opera-
tion of blast furnaces was an urgent issue.  When the “Phase II Ex-
pansion Plan” was prepared, it was decided that the scale of expan-
sion should be sufficient and in line with the goal, that is, the 
production of 300,000 tons of steel materials.  It was also decided 
to explore iron ore sources abroad.  An important matter was to try 
to further scientific research in iron and steel making technology. 
The development of engineers’ and workmen’s skills was also im-
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portant.  For these purposes, a large delegation consisting of about 
20 engineers and workmen was sent to GHH or Krupp in Germany 
to participate in educational courses.
A large delegation for Germany (1912)
Position at Yawata Works eductional course in Germany
Ryuta Endo assistant engineer
coordinater of group members
Harutaka Obara assistant engineer
Takahiko Enbu assistant engineer
operation of blast fumaceShingo Ujo assistant engineer
Kumakichi Tanaka group leader of blast fumace
Shozo Kubota assistant engineer
operation of open-hearth
Matajiro Kaku corporal of open-hearth
Keichi Ban assistant engineer operation of converter
Ryukichi Katsuya assistant engineer making rail
　　　　Tatsuno assistant engineer
making steel bars
Kyudayu Takahashi corporal of rolling
Ryuta Endo assistant engineer
making steel sheetsGichiro Hara assistant engineer
Kisuke Hayashi group leader of rolling
Harutaka Obara assistant engineer operation of electric steel oven
Kunpei Gondo assistant engineer making rollers
Toru Watanabe assistant engineer operation of gas engine
Three Expansion Plans at the Yawata Works
investment
(10,000yen) terms
demand of 
steels
(10,000tons)
productive
scale of
making steels
(10,000tons)
notes
First 1,088 1906~1909 (28) 18 The third blast fumace (160t/d), etc
Second 1,238 1906~1909 40 30
The fourth blast fumace (250t/d). The 
second Steelmaking Plant, Electrification 
etc
Third 3,451(7,193)
1906~1909
　　　(1929) 100 65
large steel plates and sheets, abolishment 
of Bessemer Converters, 800,000tons of
Japan’s commitment to modern iron and steel technology started at the 
end of the Tokugawa era, when a reverberatory furnace was built in 
Saga.  Later the State-owned Steel Works at Yahata was launched.  The 
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start up phase was concluded in 1910, when an integrated mill was 
firmly stabilised, producing both pig iron and steel successfully.  This 
means that, while it took Europe 400 years to achieve such technologi-
cal development, Japan acquired the same magnitude of advancement 
in less than half a century.  Certainly it was an “extremely condensed 
and intensive modernisation process”.  Here let us try to understand 
the historic meaning of the State-owned Yawata Steel Works in a wider 
global context.  What was the significance of this national undertaking, 
when viewed from western and Asian perspectives?
The integrity of the production facilities at the Yawata  Works could 
well rival that of advanced nations.
(1)　The total internal volume of blast furnaces at the  Yawata 
Works was 440m3, slightly over the national average of the Unit-
ed States, 400m3.  The blast furnace production capacity per unit 
was 60,000 tons, which doubled that at the largest British iron 
works, Workington Iron and Steel Company, which recorded 
30,000 tons.  It would be fair to say that Japan had already sur-
passed the production levels of Britain and France, and was 
catching up with the USA.
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The productive scale of the largest Steelmaking Company in the advanced countries
year Pigiron Crude Steel FinishedSteel
U.S. Steel Corp. (U.S.A)
　〃　Gary Works (U.S.A)
Phonix-Horder
Bergswerk
Huttenverein (Germany)
Wakington Iron Co (U.K.)
Denan et d’ Anzin (France)
Yawata Works
1913
1913
1907
1909
1913
1913
14,100
1,090
600
335
177
16,600
1,670
396
11,900
1,190
1,130
200
217
note: units are 1,000tons
The capacity of the Blast Furnace
Blast
Fumace
ginning
(year)
Volume
(?)
Daily
Production
(tons)
Volume per
daily 1 ton
pigiron (?)
Yawata Works
Guetenhoffnungshutte
Gary Works, US Steel
No.1
No.10
No.10
1910
1912
1915
440
610
670
162
420
480
2.71
1.45
1.40
(2)　 As far as steel material production was concerned, however, Ja-
pan was far behind the west.  The data recorded the volumes, 1.2 
million tons produced by US Steel Gary Works in the USA, 1.1 
million tons by Phoenix Iron Works in Germany, 1.0 million tons 
by Krupp AG in Germany and 700,000 tons by Workington Iron 
and Steel Company in the UK.  The inferiority of the enterprise 
of Yawata, producing only 180,000 tons of steel materials, was 
obvious.   Facing this challenge, Naonori Sumino, one of the then 
engineers in the steel department, who became head of the Ya-
wata  Works in 1946, serving in the post for the next 16 years, 
described those circumstances in his paper “Steel Production at 
the Yawata Works: Celebrating the 30th Anniversary of Founda-
tion”.  The report analysed the steel production facilities and op-
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erational technology of the Yawata Works from a global perspec-
tive.  Sumino compared the steel making performance of Yawata 
with the west, judging that it had been fairly well developed by 
then, and “good enough to be ranked in the middle of the inter-
national steel making community”.
Map of the Han Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu
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Prior to World War I, as far as the construction of a modern integrated 
mill in Asia was concerned, effort had already commenced in China.  It 
was several years ahead of Japan.  The plan of the Han-yang Iron and 
Steel Works was announced in 1891.  The first blow-in took place in 
1894.  Han-yang was Asia’s first integrated mill producing pig iron, 
steel and steel products.  Chang Chih-tung, a Chinese statesman, who 
was then governor-general of the region corresponding to present day 
Hunan and Hubei Provinces, commissioned H. Hobson, a British engi-
neer, to supervise the construction of an integrated mill at Hanjiang 
(now Wuhan).  The design production capacity was 100 tons per day. 
The plant was to consist of a blast furnace, a converter furnace, an open 
hearth furnace, 20 puddling furnaces and rolling mills.  It was planned 
that iron ore would be supplied by the Ta-yeh Iron and Steel Works and 
that this state-run enterprise would produce steel materials for the 
manufacture of arms for the Chinese military as well as rails to con-
struct railroads.  In his work “History of Iron V (4)”, Ludwig Beck de-
scribed how, before the Han-yang Iron and Steel Works was estab-
lished, an arsenal founded by the army in 1867 at Fuzhou in Fujian 
Province had been the only iron works in China.  The facility at that ar-
senal was a very small furnace with a height of 5 to 6 feet, into which 
air was blown by means of wooden bellows.  Charcoal was used as fuel. 
All that was produced was a kind of pig iron based on sand iron.  It is 
worth noting that, in its first step toward steel industry development, 
China embarked upon a most modern and sophisticated programme, 
that is, the construction of an integrated mill, capable of producing pig 
iron and steel simultaneously.  China did not bother with less advanced 
technology such as the charcoal blast furnace or the older iron making 
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process developed in the UK during the Industrial Revolution. The 
Han-yang Iron and Steel Works invited engineers and workmen from 
Belgium for technology transfer.   Furthermore, about 80 Chinese work-
men were sent to Belgium, where they received training at iron and 
steel works.  The plant started up at the end of June 1894.
The Pigiron Production and Sale Abroad of Han-yang Iron and Steel Works
(Tons, ％ )
Domastic
Production
In China
Production
of Hang-
yang Works
(Pigiron) (Steel) Sale Abroad （％）
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
5,316
5,040
12,292
32,440
42,996
45,470
48,026
41,256
38,731
38,875
38,771
32,314
50,622
70,686
89,036
113,406
169,509
131,977
180,510
310,150
355,850
385,016
414,858
400,966
385,794
442,594
497,808
5,316
5,040
12,292
32,440
42,996
45,470
48,026
41,256
38,731
38,875
38,771
32,314
50,622
70,686
89,036
113,406
169,509
131,977
11,310
110,149
182,098
184,900
191,669
192,582
166,148
170,947
163,707
4,636
4,360
11,055
24,002
20,491
25,483
25,892
28,805
15,825
38,875
38,771
32,314
50,622
62,148
66,410
74,406
119,396
93,336
7,989
67,512
130,846
136,531
146,624
149,929
139,152
166,096
124,947
680
680
1,237
8,418
22,506
19,987
22,134
12,451
22,906
0
0
0
0
8.538
22,626
39,000
50,113
38,640
3,321
42,637
51,252
48,369
45,045
42,653
26,996
4,851
38,760
?
-
-
Japan
-
-
-
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
U.S.A
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
Japan
2,965
-  　
-  　
4,250
-  　
-  　
-  　
138
12.334
25,130
34,326
33,326
30,890
38,713
65,362
70,875
19,164
15,172
14,800
15,000
50,936
40,950
49,684
50,000
60,000
75,460
33.0
-  　
-  　
9.2
-  　
-  　
-  　
0.4
31.8
77.8
67.8
53.6
46.5
52.0
54.7
75.9
20.5
189.9
21.9
11.5
37.3
27.9
33.1
35.9
36.1
60.4
In December of the same year, however, coke supplies were disrupted, 
which forced the mill to suspend its operations for the next 10 months. 
Performance continued to deteriorate.  Eventually, in 1895, the enter-
prise was placed under the auspices of the “kuan-tu shang-pan” system 
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(official supervision and merchant management). The new organisation 
was led by the aforementioned Sheng Hsuan-huai.  The biggest prob-
lem for Han-yang was the lack of a stable coke supply, so the unstable 
operation persisted.  Rail production by the Bessemer converter process 
was hampered due to excess phosphorus in the raw materials.  Up to 
that point, the situation at Han-yang was just the same as that of the 
Yawata  Works in its initial period.  However, the paths that the two in-
tegrated steel mills followed separated after that, and the gap between 
them widened over time.  When exposed to financial shortage, the man-
agement at Han-yang resorted to an injection of foreign capital.  The 
company borrowed money from a general trading house of German ori-
gin.  Foreign capital made inroads into this Chinese enterprise.  Under 
those circumstances, Gustav Toppe, a German engineer, who later be-
came one of the consulting engineers for the Yawata Works, was invited 
in as head of the engineering division.  Nevertheless, the inventory of 
defective rails continuously increased, urging Han-yang to embark 
upon a drastic reform programme.  A Chinese delegation headed by Li 
Weige was sent abroad in 1904, examining the iron and steel making 
industry outside China.  Following its report, the converter furnace was 
dismantled, and the basic open hearth furnace was enhanced.  In order 
to fund this rehabilitation programme, the Han-yang Iron and Steel 
Works received a loan from Japan for the first time.  It was designed in 
consideration of Ta-yeh iron ore exported to Japan.  This arrangement 
was useful to Japan, because it secured the supply of iron ore for the 
Yawata Works.  As time went by, Han-yang’s loan from Japan snow-
balled rapidly.  In 1908, the Ta-yeh Iron Mines and Ping-hsiang Coal 
Mines were combined, forming a new organisation called the Han-
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Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu.  In October of the same year, Sheng Hsuan-huai 
visited the Yawata Works.  Later, commenting on the useful technical 
information he had gained during that visit, he referred to the duplex 
method, in which the converter and open hearth processes were com-
bined.  He also appreciated Yawata’s coke oven, which incorporated a 
mechanism to collect by-products.  If we compare the performance data 
of the two plants as of 1910, it is clear that the Han-Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu 
was plagued with serious problems in steel and steel materials.
Profit and Loss at The Han-Yey-P’ing kung-ssu
　　　　　　(yuan)
5000000
4000000
3000000
2000000
1000000
0
-1000000
-2000000
-3000000
-4000000
-5000000
1908年 1910年 1912年 1914年 1916年 1918年 1920年 1922年 1924年
出典：湖北省冶金志編纂委員会編『漢冶萍公司誌』125頁
Pig iron　　 Steel　　　
Han-Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu
Yawata Works
119,396 tons
126,894 tons
 50,113 tons
153,491 tons
In 1911, the Han-Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu began to deliver pig iron to Yawa-
ta, resulting in an upsurge in their loans from Japan.  Seeking solu-
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tions to those problems, the Han-Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu accepted Japanese 
special advisers to the engineering and accounting divisions.   The spe-
cial adviser for engineering was Michitaro Oshima, the first main tech-
nical officials at the enterprise of Yawata.  Despite such efforts, the per-
sistence of poor performance in rail production prevented the Han-
Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu from restructuring its business.  It could not be free 
from deficits.  In 1925, pig iron production was discontinued and the 
Ping-hsiang Coal Mines was requisitioned by the local government of 
Wuhan.   In the end, all that was left of the enterprise was the business 
of selling Ta-yeh iron ore to Yawata.  Asia’s first integrated iron and 
steel mill collapsed after all.
Chinese data concerning demand and supply of steel shows a rapid in-
crease in demand around World War I, when China relied heavily on 
imported steel.  After that period, however, demand became sluggish. 
After the fall of Han-Yeh-P’ing kung-ssu, the traditional Chinese “Tufa” 
pig iron manufacturing method was restored.  Afterwards, all that was 
left in China was “Tufa” pig iron manufacture.
Production and Import of Pigiron in China (1914~1936, tons)
Han-Yey-Ping Liu-He-Gou Bao-Jin Tufa
Total
Domestic
Production
Imported
1914
1916
1918
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
130,000
149,930
139,152
126,305
148,424
26,977
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
7,624
15,248
−
7,498
5,814
−
19,283
16,960
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
4,800
4,814
2,587
−
3,680
＊　　　
170,000
170,000
170,000
170,000
170,000
170,000
178,870
178,870
122,226
135,000
135,000
＊　　　
300,000
319,930
309,152
309,929
333,672
196,977
191,168
189,498
124,813
154,283
155,640
＊　　　
145,584
180,187
107,339
181,016
81,293
104,491
238,309
374,614
333,553
441,106
437,753
344,474
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Demand and Supply of Iron and Steel in China (1912~1934, tons)
Domestic
Production
Import of iron
and steel
Export if iron
and steel
Domestic
Consumotion
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
177,989
267,513
300,000
336,061
369,160
357,635
354,144
446,588
427,748
402,787
393,694
343,442
330,521
369,617
434,668
441,148
463,843
463,458
488,000
493,000
160,000
176,000
159,000
151,276
244,739
230,551
125,658
145,847
123,268
149,117
325,158
366,622
272,782
364,875
309,817
493,624
405,266
433,582
389,061
624,898
634,192
527,000
558,000
431,000
526,000
618,000
12,499
67,086
62,011
102,123
154,745
163,283
189,085
166,424
196,807
162,680
209,609
213,539
269,704
161,329
168,693
200,832
216,969
202,145
180,000
247,000
187,000
7,000
7,000
316,766
445,166
468,540
359,596
360,262
317,620
344,176
635,322
627,463
542,879
578,960
469,720
584,541
643,554
699,557
629,371
871,772
895,505
835,000
804,000
404,000
694,000
770,000
What about India?  An iron ore seam was discovered in Bihar, West 
Bengal.  In addition, the old Indian Mining Law was abolished in 1889, 
liberalising the mining industry.  These developments propelled India 
to strengthen its commitment to advancing the iron and steel industry. 
India imported a series of western technological items encompassing 
reverberatory furnaces, charcoal blast furnaces (1830), coke blast fur-
naces (1875) and open hearth furnaces (1892).   The open hearth fur-
naces were introduced into arsenals for steel production.  Unfortunate-
ly, none of those attempts succeeded in establishing an economically 
viable business.  Against this backdrop, in 1911, ten years after the 
launch of the Yawata  Works, Jamsetji Tata, the founder of the Tata 
Group, started the Tata Iron and Steel Co. at Jamshedpur in Bihar 
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State.  This was an integrated mill designed on the basis of American 
technology.  The plant consisted of two blast furnaces with a daily pro-
duction capacity of 170 tons each.  It produced 100,000 tons of steel 
products per year.  The scale of the plant was similar to that of Yawata. 
The strength of the Tata enterprise was that the iron ore mines were 
owned by the group, which enabled the company to produce pig iron at 
a low cost.  The plant management and engineering matters were left 
in the hands of American experts hired by the company.  By 1937, the 
company had hired six Americans in a row, who served contractual 
terms of office as head of the plant.  In the mid 1910’s Jamsetji Tata 
visited Japan, where he observed that Japanese iron works were “man-
aged and operated by Japanese people only”.  With this discovery, it 
dawned on him that the “Indianisation” of engineers should be started. 
In order to develop Indian engineers and skilled labour, he founded an 
educational institute of technology on the premises of the company 
(1921).  Between 1920 and 1924, he exercised leadership to materialise 
an innovation programme called the “Greater Extension” project.  This 
brought about a drastic renovation of the plant, introducing blast fur-
naces with a capacity of 600 tons each.  The company adopted the du-
plex method, in which converter and open hearth furnace processes 
were combined.  The company diversified its product portfolio as well. 
While conventional products such as steel rails and wires for construc-
tion, which had been sold from the start, still remained as major items, 
new products were added.  These were thick steel plates, thin steel 
sheets, steel bars & rods and other things.  Tata made drastic progress 
with the increase in blast furnace capacity, the commitment to which 
was intensive, continuing until the beginning of the 1920’s.  In contrast, 
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on the part of the Yawata Works, progress in blast furnace capacity was 
rather sluggish until the 1930’s.
DEVELOPMENT PATTERN OF INDIAN STEEL INDUSTRY
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Employees in Tisco
Pig-iron
Crude
Steel
making
Finished
Steel
making
Total
1912
1915
1920
1925
1930
1933
1940
874
925
2,301
2,016
836
529
982
968
1,112
2,348
2,411
1,451
1,299
1,552
1,665
2,936
5,626
5,239
5,271
6,469
3,394
3,702
7,585
10,053
7,526
7,099
Output Per Employee in Tisco Compared with Yawata Works
Tisco Yawata
Pig-iron
making
Crude
Steel
making
Finished
Steel
making
Pig-iron
making
Crude
Steel
making
Finished
Steel
making
1912
1915
1920
1925
1930
1933
1940
146
170
110
284
854
1,592
1,202
32
111
73
195
431
555
12
55
42
57
85
102
129
69
363
682
974
1,000
223
381
409
622
679
80
159
169
261
233
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Cost of Production in Tisco (Rupeees per ton)
Pig-iron Steel Bar
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
34.5
38.7
36.6
32.7
28.5
25.0
22.9
24.4
22.7
22.7
20.8
19.4
18.6
151.2
129.1
126.5
119.9
115.2
97.3
86.1
92.5
93.3
89.8
76.9
72.7
69.9
Production in Tata Iron and Steel Co. (Tisco, 1,000tons)
Iron-one Pig-iron CrudeSteel
Finished
Steel
1911
1915
1920
1925
1930
1935
1940
135
251
409
1,121
1,190
1,542
1,867
36
160
258
582
725
914
1,199
3
125
174
479
635
894
1,101
1
93
124
325
450
672
847
Foreign Technical Personnel Engaged in Tisco
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
72
74
72
98
172
150
154
150
139
125
115
Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd The Yawata  Works Iron & Steel Works of Greatest Productivity In the USA
1911:  175 tons/day
1919:  315 tons
1922:  600 tons
1933:  700 tons
1901:  160 tons
1921:  300tons
1930:  500tons
1889:  347 tons(Edgar Thomson Steel Works in Pennsylvania) 
1907:  504tons( Edgar Thomson Works )
1919:  672tons( South Works )
1929:  1,092tons( Ohio Works ) (By Oba)
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 Although the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. grew steadily in a sense, its 
success did not provide so much momentum for the iron and steel in-
dustry in India as a whole.  Its influence was limited, and it failed to 
support the modernisation and industrialisation of the country in gen-
eral.  It did not benefit the Indian national economy to any large extent. 
Indian data concerning demand and supply of steel materials suggests 
that demand stagnated at around a level of 1.0 million tons during the 
1920’s and 1930’s.  Until 1930, imported steel accounted for about one 
half of total supply.  Apart from the Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., the 
Bengal Iron Corporation and the Indian Iron and Steel Company were 
considered major iron works in India.  Both were pig iron manufactur-
ers dedicated to pig iron export to Japan.  Kishimoto Shoten, a Japa-
nese trading house specialising in iron and steel trading, was involved 
in their transactions as an intermediary. Many Japanese steel manu-
facturers with open hearth furnaces and foundry businesses were sup-
ported by pig iron imports from India.
Demand and Supply Steel in India (1,000tons)
Production Import Export DomesticDemand
1920
1922
1924
1926
1928
1930
1932
1934
1936
1938
124
117
252
380
293
450
438
620
701
745
782
906
956
891
1,184
618
329
373
366
268
1
1
2
1
1
3
30
1
3
24
905
1,022
1,186
1,270
1,476
1,065
737
992
1,064
989
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Production and Export of Pig Iron in India (tons, ％）
Production of Pig Iron Export of Pig Iron
B/A
（％）
Production
of Crude
Steel
Foundry
Pig Iron
Basic
Pig Iron Others Total (A) Japan （％） UK Others Total (B)
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
136,145
149,373
178,420
221,910
426,887
644,789
603,924
559,721
828,230
816,613
1,079,473
873,221
538,522
283,661
296,950
471,149
457,009
541,700
181,062
161,424
189,054
115,992
183,219
222,146
274,516
326,439
306,901
229,955
307,584
301,625
519,530
629,556
760,808
854,790
994,852
998,356
2,777
1,642
3,588
3,334
3,521
9,873
9,068
14,253
10,012
8,549
8,108
4,999
14,366
366
7,725
5,536
14,182
3,263
319,984
312,439
371,062
341,236
613,627
876,808
887,508
900,413
1,145,143
1,055,117
1,395,165
1,179,845
1,072,418
913,583
1,065,483
1,331,475
1,466,043
1,543,319
80,100
65,318
29,859
38,676
69,031
39,307
9,507
40,093
47,368
58,565
112,511
144,016
171,665
168,188
234,529
270,956
353,581
349,512
160,584
188,106
71,371
183,832
245,552
397,034
306,173
86.5
79.1
56.9
59.2
67.5
79.0
99.1
96.0
97.8
98.4
94.9
78.6
50.3
44.0
75.8
68.9
78.8
61.4
36.6
53.6
32.7
48.7
58.9
73.7
53.3
51
424
3,206
19,024
20,178
16,159
21,060
5,522
71,277
98,950
69,088
75,802
93,123
98,481
65,763
182,334
12,514
17,274
22,196
32,702
33,298
10,475
89
1,605
1,056
952
5,610
35,973
150,637
193,623
58,817
101,233
89,843
148,024
179,601
93,664
71,211
100,559
73,026
75,356
85,803
92,614
82,592
52,055
71,378
102,329
49,782
9,647
41,698
48,424
59,517
118,545
183,195
341,326
381,989
309,505
393,249
448,946
568,813
439,135
350,858
218,384
377,514
417,059
538,153
574,310
13.0
15.5
16.0
34.7
29.9
38.9
43.0
34.4
34.3
42.5
40.8
37.2
32.7
23.9
35.4
31.3
36.7
37.2
186,902
156,239
182,690
150,475
215,465
335,442
449,053
521,753
574,096
409,710
575,310
618,922
625,148
569,810
694,073
797,569
862,344
865,770
These observations on the steel making industry in other Asian coun-
tries clearly show the unique features of the Yawata  Works:
(1)　Technology transfer with autonomy
There were some common features among the iron and steel works 
in China, India and Japan in the way in which they started their 
businesses.  All three enterprises carried out programmes
  i)  to introduce the most advanced facilities and technology from 
the west, 
 ii)  to invite consulting engineers from abroad to receive techni-
cal guidance and
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iii)  to enhance the knowledge and skill of engineers and work-
men by sending them abroad for training.  When it comes to 
the question of “eventual independence from supervision by 
foreign engineers, thus establishing autonomy”, however, it 
was only the Yawata Works that succeeded in doing so.
Comparision of the Productive Facilities with Hanyang, Tawata and Tata Works
Hanyang Works Yawata Works Tata Works
1891 1910 1917 1901
1906
(before
the first 
Expansion)
1916
(after the
second
Expansion)
1911
Blast Fumaces 100t×2 100t×2250t×1
100t×2
250t×1 160t×1 160t×2
160t×1
235t×1
200t×2
175t×2
Open Hearthes 12t×? 30t×7 30t×7 25t×4 25t×8
25t×12
10t×1
50t×4
15t×1
40t×2
Bessemer Converters 5.5t×2 10t×2 10t×2 10t×2
Coke Ovens Coppee 114 Beehive 460
Beehive 460
Haldy 90
Coppee 120
Coppee 60
Semet-
Solvay 150
Koppers 120
？
(2)　Contribution to progress in both national and local industrialisation
Yawata’s dramatic progress had significant repercussions on the 
whole nation, driving the Japanese iron and steel industry to move 
forward.  It contributed significantly to Japanese industrialisation. 
At the end of the Meiji era, other integrated mills sprang up in var-
ious parts of Japan.  These were Kobe Steel, Ltd. in Kobe, Kawasa-
ki Steel Corporation in Kobe, Muroran Ironworks in Hokkaido, Ni-
hon Kokan Kabushiki Kaisha (NKK) in Kawasaki City, Kanagawa, 
and Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. in Osaka.  Around World War 
I, a series of iron and steel manufacturing businesses were 
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launched along Dokai Bay near the Yawata  Works.  These were 
Asano Ironworks(now Sumitomo Metal Industries Ltd.), Toyo 
Ironworks(now Nippon Steel Tobata Works), Nippon Pig Iron , Ky-
ushu Steel (now Yawata Nishi Works), Nippon Steel and Tokai Ko-
gyo.  The increase in demand for steel materials was driven not 
only by the military but also by the private sector.  Great progress 
was made in metal processing, machine manufacturing, railway 
development and construction works.  The Yawata Works was char-
acterised by its capability to manufacture a wide variety of steel 
materials for diverse customers.  The German technology that Ya-
wata chose was most suitable for this policy, enabling them to en-
compass a wide range of products, and thus responding to the na-
tional policy.  In the 1920’s and onward, the majority of Yawata’s 
business was accounted for by sales to the private sector.  This fact 
is strong evidence that Yawata played a pivotal role in Japan’s in-
dustrialisation, which started in the Meiji Restoration.
In fact, the iron and steel industry was supported by modern tech-
nology.  Its scale was the largest and its nature most complicated of 
all industries.  As for import substitution, many developing coun-
tries succeeded fairly quickly in launching consumer goods and 
light industries.  However, steel was a completely different story. 
Intermediate goods such as steel materials and capital goods had 
to be manufactured by heavy industry.  Many developing nations 
experienced great difficulties in initiating substitution industries 
for such manufactured goods.  While import substitution was de-
layed, it was inevitable that those countries would accumulate cur-
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rent account deficits in the international balance of payments. 
This aggravation of the international balance of payments ham-
pered economic development.  It is to be understood, therefore, that 
Japan was much more fortunate in its progress of industrialisation, 
although such efforts started rather late in the world.  While Japan 
endeavoured to advance industrialisation, aspiring to enter the in-
dustrial world community, the Yawata Works provided essential 
support for it.  It functioned as a locomotive for that undertaking. 
Indeed that was the very meaning of the  Yawata  Works.
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